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Abstract
MapReduce is a programming system for distributed processing large-scale data in an efficient and
fault tolerant manner on a private, public, or hybrid cloud. MapReduce is extensively used daily
around the world as an efficient distributed computation tool for a large class of problems, e.g., search,
clustering, log analysis, different types of join operations, matrix multiplication, pattern matching, and
analysis of social networks. Security and privacy of data and MapReduce computations are essential
concerns when a MapReduce computation is executed in public or hybrid clouds. In order to execute
a MapReduce job in public and hybrid clouds, authentication of mappers-reducers, confidentiality
of data-computations, integrity of data-computations, and correctness-freshness of the outputs are
required. Satisfying these requirements shield the operation from several types of attacks on data and
MapReduce computations. In this paper, we investigate and discuss security and privacy challenges
and requirements, considering a variety of adversarial capabilities, and characteristics in the scope of
MapReduce. We also provide a review of existing security and privacy protocols for MapReduce and
discuss their overhead issues.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing [74] infrastructure provides on-demand, easy, and scalable access to a shared
pool of configurable resources, without worrying about managing those resources. Details about
cloud computing can be found in [26, 130]. Clouds provide three types of services, as follows:
(i) infrastructure-as-a-service, IaaS, provides infrastructure in terms of virtual machines, storage,
and networks, (ii) platform-as-a-service, PaaS, provides a scalable software platform allowing the
development of custom applications, and (iii) software-as-a-service, SaaS, provides software running
in clouds as a service, for example, emails and databases. Clouds can be classified into three types, as
follows: (i) public cloud: a cloud that provides services to many users and is not under the control of
a single exclusive user, (ii) private cloud: a cloud that has its proprietary resources and is under the
control of a single exclusive user, and (iii) hybrid cloud: a combination of public and private clouds.
One of the most common platform-as-a-service computational paradigms is MapReduce [35],
introduced by Google in 2004. MapReduce provides an efficient and fault tolerant parallel processing
of large-scale data without any costly and dedicated computing node like a supercomputer. At the
beginning, MapReduce was designed to be deployed on-premises under mistaken assumption that
local environment can be completely trusted. Thus, security and privacy aspects were overlooked in
the initial design. As MapReduce gained popularity the lack of security and privacy in on-premises
deployment become severe shortcoming. In addition, MapReduce is being deployed on both
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hybrid and public clouds, which are prone to many attacks and security threats. In the current
days, several public clouds, e.g., Amazon Elastic MapReduce, Google App Engine, IBM’s Blue
Cloud, and Microsoft Azure, enable users to perform MapReduce cloud computations without
considering physical infrastructures and software installations. Thus, the deployment of MapReduce
in public clouds enables users to process large-scale data in a cost-effective manner and establishes
a relationship between two independent entities, i.e., clouds and MapReduce. As a downside, the
deployment of MapReduce in hybrid and public cloud needs to deal with many attacks on the
communication networks and (the three service layers of) the cloud.
Data processing in the cloud highlights a tradeoff between the ease of processing and
security-privacy of data and computations. Specifically, on one hand, the deployment of MapReduce
in a well-managed public cloud provides economical and carefree resource management. On the
other hand, public clouds do not guarantee the rigorous security and privacy of computations as well
as stored data. Private clouds provide security and privacy of data as well as computations, due to
users’ ability to physically and electronically constrain data access and execution of computations.
However, the user of the private cloud manages the nodes, updates software, and replaces the failed
nodes. Such management is time consuming and incurs huge monetary cost.
Our focus is on the security and privacy issues of MapReduce environment in public or hybrid
clouds. Private cloud environments are more secure due to a physical security of the cloud. Many of
the reviewed below results are applicable to both public and hybrid clouds, unless stated otherwise
(for instance, see hybrid cloud specific research in [129, 99] and Section 4.4.1). Even though there
is a plethora of additional projects and frameworks that add functionality on top of MapReduce (see
Apache Hive [104], Cloudera Impala1, HBase [48], Apache Zookeeper2, Thrift3, and Apache Solr4),
this paper only reviews security related projects in Section 2 (readers interested in security and privacy
issues of other projects may refer to [94]).
Security aspects in the context of MapReduce are crucial in order to authenticate and authorize
users, auditing-confidentiality-integrity of data and computation, availability of mappers and reducers,
and verification of outputs. Security of MapReduce ensures a legitimate functionality of the
framework. A secure MapReduce framework deals with the following attacks: attacks on
authentication (impersonation and replay attacks), attacks on confidentiality (eavesdropping and
man-in-the-middle attacks), data tampering (modification of input data, intermediate outputs, and
the final outputs), hardware tampering, software tampering (modification of mappers and reducers),
denial-of-service, interception-release of data as well as computations, and communication analysis.
On the contrary, privacy aspects assume legitimate functionality of the framework and thus, are
built on top of security. On top of the correctly functioning framework, privacy in the context of
MapReduce is an ability of each participating party (data providers, cloud providers, and users) to
prevent other, possibly adversarial parties from observing data, codes, computations, and outputs.
In order to ensure privacy, a MapReduce algorithm in public clouds hides data storage as well as
the computation to public clouds and adversarial users. Additional distinction between security and
privacy is that security is much more of a binary issue, i.e., either the attack succeeds or not, whereas
in a privacy setting there is a tradeoff between privacy of the data and utilization of the framework.
Scope and outline of the paper. In this paper, we discuss the challenges, requirements, adversarial
models, attack scenarios and proposed solutions to the security and privacy concerns in the context
of MapReduce (see Figure 1). Overview of MapReduce environment and its open-source software
1http://impala.io/
2https://zookeeper.apache.org/.
3https://thrift.apache.org/.
4http://lucene.apache.org/solr/
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framework, Apache Hadoop, are given in Section 1.1 and Section 1.2, respectively. In Section 2, we
discuss security challenges involved in a MapReduce computation.
Security aspects of MapReduce are presented in Section 3, where we present security threats in
Section 3.1, requirements of security in MapReduce computations in Section 3.2, adversarial models
in Section 3.3, and some proposed solutions for security in MapReduce in Section 3.4. Privacy aspects
in MapReduce are presented in Section 4. We first outline privacy aspects in clouds (Section 4.1) and
privacy requirements in MapReduce in Section 4.2. Then, we present the common adversarial models
in the context of privacy in MapReduce in Section 4.3, and some proposed solutions to privacy in
MapReduce in Section 4.4. We conclude and outline important research issues in Section 5.
We would like to emphasize here that we focus on the security and privacy issues of MapReduce
framework. Despite advantages of MapReduce deployments in public clouds, they also bring new
hurdles in the form of security, data privacy, and computation privacy. Even though the new challenges
are mainly due to the public nature of the cloud, ownership separation of platform and data, location of
the service, and etc., those challenges are different from security and privacy challenges of a general
cloud computing. General security issues in the cloud such as: security of virtual machines and
hypervisors, security of services and Service-Level Agreement (SLA), regulations and organization
policies, and general availability in the cloud are not discussed in detail, and the interested reader may
refer to [22, 21, 101, 139, 122, 89, 19] for security and privacy in the cloud. Also note that we do not
consider security and privacy of MapReduce scheduling algorithms, rather than we encourage readers
to have an understanding of security and privacy of mappers, reducers, and data flow.
1.1. MapReduce Framework
Parallel processing of large-scale data provides outputs in a timely manner. However, it constrains
the computation due to node failure, ordering of outputs, system scalability, transparency, load
balancing, fault tolerance, and synchronization among the nodes. MapReduce [35] solves these
issues and executes parallel processing using a cluster of computing nodes over large-scale data,
but without considering security and privacy of data and computations. Here, we provide an overview
of MapReduce framework, details may be found in Chapter 2 of [63].
A user-defined program forks a master process and worker processes at different nodes; see
Figure 2. The master process creates and assigns map tasks and reduce tasks to idle worker processes.
A worker process deals with either a map task or a reduce task. The worker processes that handle
the map tasks and the reduce tasks are called map workers and reduce workers, respectively. A
MapReduce computation consists of the Map phase and the Reduce phase, where two user-defined
functions, namely the map function and the reduce function, are executed over (large-scale) data,
which is represented in the form of 〈key, value〉 pairs.
The Map Phase. The given input data is processed in the map phase, where the map function is applied
to data and produces intermediate outputs (of the form 〈key, value〉), where the number of bits needed
to describe the value in each 〈key, value〉 pair is not necessarily identical [9]. The application of the
map function to a single input (for example, a tuple of a relational database or a node in a graph) is
called a mapper.
The Reduce Phase. The Reduce phase provides the final output of MapReduce computations. The
Reduce phase executes the reduce function on intermediate outputs. The application of the reduce
function to a single key and its associated list of values is called a reducer.
Word count example. Word count is a traditional example to illustrate a MapReduce computation,
where the task is to count the number of occurrences of each word in a collection of documents. The
original input data is a collection of documents. Each mapper takes a document and implements a map
function that results in a set of 〈key, value〉 pairs ({〈w1, 1〉, 〈w2, 1〉, . . . , 〈wn, 1〉}), where each key, wi,
represents a word in the document, and each value is 1. The reduce task is executed subsequently,
4
Original input 
data
The map phase
Step 2: Assign map tasks
Split1
Split2
Splitm
split1
Mapper for 1st split
split2
Mapper for 2nd split
Mapper for mth split
splitm
Reducer 
for k1
Reducer 
for k2
Reducer 
for kr
k2, split2
Output 1
Output 2
Output r
Master process
Step 1: Fork a master process and 
some number of worker processes
Step 3:
Read input splits and Map tasks’
execution
Step 4:
Read intermediate data and 
Reduce tasks’ execution
The reduce phase
Step 2: Assign reduce tasks
Input data
Notation: ki: key
Figure 2: A general execution of a MapReduce algorithm.
where the reduce function adds up all the values corresponding to a key. Specifically, a reducer for
a key wi takes all the 〈key, value〉 pairs corresponding to the key (or word) wi and outputs a 〈wi,m〉
pair, where m is the total number of occurrences of the word wi in all the given documents.
Applications and models of MapReduce. Many applications in different areas exist already for
MapReduce. Among them: matrix multiplication [15], similarity join [112, 121, 14, 23], detection of
near-duplicates [72], interval join [31, 10], spatial join [52, 51, 102], graph processing [12, 70], pattern
matching [67], data cube processing [78, 91, 113, 17], skyline queries [13], k-nearest-neighbors
finding [128, 69], star-join [137], theta-join [79, 131], and image-audio-video-graph processing [126],
are a few applications of MapReduce in the real world. Some research models for efficient
MapReduce computation are presented by Karloff et al. [56], Goodrich [50], Lattanzi et al. [62],
Pietracaprina et al. [86], Goel and Munagala [49], Ullman [106], Afrati et al. [16, 18, 9, 11], and Fish
et al. [44].
1.2. Hadoop and HDFS
Apache Hadoop5 is the most known and widely used open-source software implementation of
MapReduce for distributed storage and distributed processing of large-scale data on clusters of
nodes. Hadoop includes three major components, as follows: (i) Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS) [98]: a scalable and fault-tolerant distributed storage system, (ii) Hadoop MapReduce, and
(iii) Hadoop Common, the common utilities, which support the other Hadoop modules. Hadoop 2.x,
released in 2013, has changed the low-level architecture by separating resource management from job
management (see YARN6). However, the architectural modification does not change the high-level of
the described MapReduce job, and thus, is not considered here.
Hadoop cluster consists of a master node (that runs a JobTracker and a NameNode) and several
slave nodes (where each slave node runs a TaskTracker and a DataNode); see Figure 3. JobTracker
and TaskTrackers provide an environment for a MapReduce job execution. Specifically, JobTracker
5http://hadoop.apache.org/
6http://hadoop.apache.org/docs/r2.6.0/hadoop-yarn/hadoop-yarn-site/YARN.html
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JobTracker
Master node
NameNode
TaskTracker
Slave node
DataNode TaskTracker
Slave node
DataNode
Figure 3: Structure of a Hadoop cluster with one master node and two slave nodes.
accepts a MapReduce job from a user, executes the job on (free) TaskTrackers, receives outputs
from TaskTrackers, and provides outputs to the user. TaskTrackers execute assigned jobs, provide
outputs to JobTracker, and periodically send heartbeat messages to JobTracker to show its presence
and workload.
NameNode and DataNodes provide a distributed file system, called Hadoop Distributed File
System, which supports read, write and delete operations on files, and create and delete operations
on directories. NameNode manages the cluster metadata and DataNodes, which store the data.
NameNode keeps information of files and directories using inodes. Inodes store several attributes
of files and directories, e.g., permissions, modification and access times, and disk space quotas. In
HDFS, data is divided into small splits, called blocks, (64MB and 128MB are most commonly used
sizes). Each block is independently replicated at multiple DataNodes, and block replicas are processed
by mappers and reducers. Each DataNode stores the corresponding block replicas, and two files in
the local host’s native file system are used to represent each block replica. The first file holds the data
itself, and the second file holds the block’s metadata. More details about Hadoop and HDFS may be
found in Chapter 2 of [65].
As the review focuses on security of MapReduce, it is fitting to provide a short overview
of Hadoop and HDFS security features as well. MapReduce security is discussed later on in
corresponding sections. By default, Hadoop provides no authentication making it easy to perform
destructive changes and possible attacks on other users or computing cluster. While it is possible to
configure Hadoop cluster with Kerberos authentication mechanism [1, 82, 34], extra work is required
to do that [2]. In a similar way, default configuration of HDFS provides a basic protection for the
saved data by following Unix access control. However, within HDFS cluster, by default, there is no
mechanism for identifying a user or group, though the user is trusted to present himself correctly.
Clearly, this makes it very easy for an adversarial client to read and modify data belonging to
other users. Just like Hadoop framework, HDFS can be configured to determine user identity by
its Kerberos credentials. However, just like in Hadoop’s case, the configuration requires additional
work and as such, most likely is not performed in all installations.
As mentioned, the job is done to provide security facilities for Hadoop (SecureMode [2]). The
facilities include: user and service authentication (based on Kerberos mechanism), authentication for
Web consoles and data confidentiality. The data confidentiality consists from features that encrypt
data in-transit during Hadoop calls, including data encryption on RPC, block data transfer and HTTP
access. Just like the authentication and access control mechanisms, data confidentiality requires
configuration and is not configured by default.
2. Security and Privacy Challenges in MapReduce
The massive parallel processing style of MapReduce is substantially different from the classical
computation in the cloud leading to distinct design challenges for security and privacy requirements.
In this section, we present specific security and privacy design challenges for MapReduce
computations in the cloud.
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Size of input data and its storage. Input to a MapReduce job, big-data, which is described by
the 4Vs: volume, velocity, variety, and veracity, implies a major challenge in securing MapReduce
computations. Security and privacy techniques for processing big-data have to deal with huge
amount of data, possibly arriving at high speed from different sources. Moreover, in MapReduce
computations, data is partitioned into small-sized splits that are replicated and distributed to several
nodes. Each split has to be transferred in a secure and private manner. This replicated and distributed
nature constitutes unique challenges in terms of data storage security, as compared to a system that
holds the whole data in a single place.
Highly distributed nature of MapReduce computations. The cloud computing itself does not
necessarily imply distributed computations. However, MapReduce does require large clusters of
nodes that can distributively process replicated data in parallel. The deployment of MapReduce in the
cloud requires mechanisms for protecting a large-number of nodes and data, which may be in-transit
and may be at the rest at the nodes. In particular, distributed processing over replicated data has a
higher probability for attacks as compared to a centralized system, since attackers have a much wider
range of targets to choose from. A single adversarial mapper or reducer, out of several mappers and
reducers, may provide wrong outputs, copy data for future usage, modify input data, leak confidential
data to a third party, or send the whole data to another user. Identifying a (single) adversarial mapper
or reducer is not an easy task in the scope of MapReduce.
Data flow. MapReduce computations require a complex data flow among different storage nodes,
different computing nodes, and different clouds, as follows:
• Between data storage and computing nodes: MapReduce computations are executed near the
location of data to minimize data flow; however, ensuring an identical location of data and
mappers-reducers cannot always be guaranteed. Thus, computations are typically executed
at the nodes that are not storage nodes. This leads to data flow from storage to computing
nodes. Moreover, some providers separate the computational cloud from the storage cloud;
for example Amazon Elastic MapReduce uses two different clouds: one is for executing a
MapReduce computation and the other is for storing data. This dual cloud structure requires
constant data flow between the clouds. Data flow becomes more complex when organizations
perform MapReduce computations in the hybrid clouds, where it is necessary for sensitive data
(e.g., some attributes of a relation, financial data, or health records) to remain in private clouds
and do not reach public clouds; while all the other data, called non-sensitive data (e.g., all the
attributes of a relation except some attributes holding critical information), may be processed
in public clouds.
• Between public clouds: A MapReduce computation may be executed in more than one public
cloud [97]. In that case, data flow may occur between two master processes at two different
clouds, between two mappers at two different clouds, between two reducers at two different
clouds, and a mapper and a reducer at two different clouds. Such scenarios involve data flow
over a public network, which is vulnerable to attacks.
The black-box nature of public clouds supporting MapReduce. Public clouds supporting
MapReduce do not provide any information regarding the deployment, configuration and execution of
mappers and reducers. PaaS infrastructure deploys and configures mappers and reducers dynamically
for each computation. This opaque view of MapReduce in public clouds prohibits an efficient
execution of a MapReduce computation in terms of the communication cost (the total amount of
bits that are transferred between the map phase and the reduce phase) and the replication rate [9] (the
average number of key-value pairs created for each input). On the upside, the automatic resource
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management of public clouds offloads the user’s burden. Hence, secure MapReduce computations
should allow dynamic deployment and configurations of mappers and reducers in public clouds
without increasing the communication cost.
Hybrid cloud. The hybrid cloud provides an efficient processing of sensitive and non-sensitive
data. The hybrid clouds enjoy efficient and economical resource management (provided by public
clouds) with security and privacy of sensitive data (provided by the private cloud). Unfortunately,
MapReduce is designed to work in a single cloud, and this characteristic poses additional challenges
in supporting a hybrid cloud deployment [129]. In addition, data sanitation, i.e., separation of sensitive
and non-sensitive data, and arrangement of outputs from different clouds are additional challenges to
a MapReduce computation in the hybrid clouds.
Scalability, fault tolerance, and transparency. MapReduce provides an efficient, scalable,
distributed, and fault-free processing of replicated data in parallel. An integration of security and
privacy mechanisms should not reduce efficiency, scalability, and fault tolerance of MapReduce
algorithms. Also, the involvement of security and privacy protocols in MapReduce must be
transparent to users, without any modification of the map and reduce functions.
Economical issues. An execution of MapReduce computations in public clouds is tariffed mainly for
three economical factors – data storage, the communication cost, and computation time. MapReduce
algorithms also regard these three economical factors. Therefore, security and privacy mechanisms
must be economically incorporated into MapReduce computations.
Untrusted data access. MapReduce allows great flexibility in enabling user defined computations;
but at the same time, implies a great trust in users for providing mapper and reducer codes
that do not impact MapReduce cluster, in terms of slowing/corrupting the entire job, modifying
modifying/deleting data, and other unwanted read/write operations. Security and privacy algorithms
for MapReduce should be developed to cope with corrupted or even adversarial codes, protecting
data, and limiting data access of corrupted mappers and reducers.
All the above challenges to MapReduce framework in clouds indicate new security and privacy
requirements. In the next sections, we discuss the requirements of security in MapReduce.
3. Security Aspects in MapReduce
The security of data and computations plays a significant role in MapReduce computations on
both hybrid and public clouds. Without security, MapReduce computations as well as MapReduce
infrastructures can be affected by several types of attacks. In this section, we present security threats
and security requirements for MapReduce computations. Notice that even though some security
threats and security requirements are common for MapReduce and for generic cloud computing, we
will focus on security threats and security requirements in the context of MapReduce. Following that,
we provide a brief summary of some existing security algorithms for MapReduce.
3.1. Security Threats in MapReduce
In this section, we present security threats that can harm a MapReduce computation and the
framework in the absence of secure MapReduce environment. Distributed and replicated data
processing in MapReduce open an opportunity for a wide range of attacks. While those attacks follow
the same ideas as attacks in different cloud computation models, the exact application is different for
MapReduce paradigm.
Notice that most of these attacks are specific to MapReduce deployments in public clouds, as
physical security and separation of private cloud deployments significantly reduce the risk of attacks
and allow a physical separation of resources from attackers.
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Impersonation attack. Definition: An impersonation attack occurs when an adversary successfully
pretends to be a legitimate user of a system by a brute-force attack on weak passwords, weak
encryption schemes, or other means.
MapReduce context: After a successful impersonation attack an adversary can act on behalf of a
legal user and can execute MapReduce jobs that may result in data leakage, data and computations
tampering, or wrong computations on data [93, 125, 41]. Moreover, on public clouds under
impersonation attack, an attacker may perform MapReduce computations while the impersonated
user is tariffed for data storage, the communication cost and computation time.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Definition: A DoS attack occurs when an adversary causes a system
and the network to become non-functional and non-accessible by legitimate users.
MapReduce context: A DoS attack occurs when an adversary makes a node, mapper, or reducer to
be non-functional and non-accessible by executing undesirable and useless tasks [118]. Moreover, a
compromised node, mapper, or reducer may result in non-functionality of other non-compromised
nodes, mappers, or reducers by repeatedly sending task requests for them to execute [118]. In
addition, if an attacker compromises enough nodes in a Hadoop cluster, it may result in the failure of
the whole MapReduce framework and the network overload [54].
Replay attack. Definition: A replay attack occurs when an adversary resends (or replays) a captured
valid message to the nodes.
MapReduce context: A replay attack occurs when an adversary assigns some old tasks to the
nodes, making them continuously busy [118]. In addition, an adversary can replay users’ credentials
to access the framework, and it may lead to impersonation [84, 36] and DoS attacks by spinning
excessive amount of nodes.
Eavesdropping. Definition: An eavesdropping attack occurs when an adversary (passively) monitors
the network and the nodes without consent.
MapReduce context: An eavesdropping attack occurs when an adversary observes input data,
intermediate outputs, the final outputs, and MapReduce computations without any consent from the
data and computation’s owner [97, 118, 96].
Man-in-the-Middle (MiM) attacks. Definition: In MiM, an adversary (actively) modifies, corrupts,
or inserts data passing between two legitimate users of a system.
MapReduce context: A MiM attack occurs when an adversary modifies or corrupts the computing
codes, input data, intermediate outputs, or the final outputs passing between any two legitimate nodes
of the framework [97, 118, 96]. Moreover, tampering with mappers or reducers may lead to DoS,
impersonation, and replay attacks [118].
Repudiation. Definition: A repudiation attack occurs when a node falsely denies processing a sent
message or a task execution.
MapReduce context: A repudiation attack occurs when a mapper or reducer falsely denies an
execution request that it already performed [41].
Despite the severity of all the above mentioned attacks, by default, MapReduce does not provide
any way to encounter them. (Details of the above mentioned attacks on the computer networks are
given in [120, 84].) In the next section, we present security requirements in MapReduce.
3.2. Security Requirements in MapReduce
Dynamic deployment and configuration of mappers and reducers for each MapReduce
computation specify distinct security requirements in MapReduce as compared to the classical parallel
processing and cloud computing. Specifically, the allocation of different heterogeneous resources
for different MapReduce computations, variability in the locations of resources, and different trust
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levels for different jobs are a few parameters that complicate the security of MapReduce. In order
to overcome security challenges in MapReduce computations, a secure MapReduce must provide
authenticated and authorized access, confidentiality (a secure storage and computation), integrity (a
fair execution and storage), and accounting-auditing of data and computations. Next, we present the
security requirements needed in a MapReduce computation. Most of the security requirements and
corresponding cloud layers are depicted in Figure 4. As can be seen from Figure 4, we do not deal
with issues of security above the MapReduce layer such as those of Pig, Hive, or big-data applications.
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Figure 4: Security requirements in MapReduce environment on the cloud. The figure shows a
complete picture of the considered cloud structure, with different participating parties: data providers
on the left, cloud provider in the middle and users on the right, and their specific security requirements.
The figure also depicts various cloud levels and their relation to the security mechanisms.
Authentication, authorization, and access control of mappers and reducers. Authentication
provides a way to identify an adversarial mapper, reducer, or user. In other words, authentication
is a process by which only those mappers and reducers that have rights to process data perform
assigned tasks, and all the other mappers and reducers who are not allowed to access data and the
framework are denied. Once mappers and reducers are authenticated, authorization of mappers and
reducers allows them to access and process data by investigating their access privileges to that data.
Access control provides pre-configured policies that restrict an unauthorized user to access data and
to access the framework. An adversarial mapper, reducer, or user mimics a legal mapper, reducer, or
user, while breaching authentication and authorization. Attacks on authentication and authorization
mechanisms are impersonation and replay attacks. The framework and data cannot be processed by
any adversarial mapper, reducer, and user, when authentication, authorization, and access control of
mappers and reducers are functioning properly.
Availability of data, mappers, and reducers. Data, mappers, and reducers should be available to
authenticated and authorized users without delay. An adversarial code may make mappers-reducers
and the network too busy so that they cannot process data and available to transfer data, respectively.
An attack on availability of data, mappers, and reducers can interrupt MapReduce computations.
Specifically, an attack such as Denial-of-Service, is an attack on availability of data, mappers,
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and reducers. As an example, a single adversarial user in multi-users cloud-based MapReduce
environment can considerably impact job completion times of the entire cluster even when using
less than 10% of cluster resources [54].
Confidentiality of computations and data. Confidentiality of computations and data refers to the
protection of computations and data, which may be in-transit from the user’s location to the location
of computations or may be stored at public clouds, from unauthorized users and the public cloud
itself. An attack on confidentiality of computations and data is interception (i.e., eavesdropping and
man-in-the-middle attacks). By ensuring confidentiality, one cannot intercept computations and data
during the transmission and following transmission on public clouds themselves.
Integrity of computations and data. Integrity of a computation refers to a fair transmission (of a
MapReduce computation from the user’s location to the locations of the computation) and execution
of mappers and reducers. Similarly, integrity of data refers to a fair transmission and storage of data.
An attack on integrity of computations and data modifies computations or the data. To overcome such
attacks, integrity should be preserved such that any modification and loss of computations and data
by public clouds or an adversarial user is detected [123, 118]. However, the amount of data hurdles
to check the integrity of computations and the integrity of the whole data at a single computing
node [118].
Verification of outputs. Verification of outputs is a difficult task in MapReduce due to a massive
parallel processing and a huge amount of input/output data. Verification ensures completeness (i.e.,
all the possible outputs are produced by mappers and reducers by processing of assigned input data
without any tampering), correctness (i.e., all the outputs are legitimate and generated from assigned
input data without any tampering), and freshness (i.e., all the outputs are new, not containing any old
output, and generated from input data without any tampering) of outputs [119].
Accounting and auditing of computations and data. Accounting of computations and data
assists in locating mappers or reducers who are taking adversary actions over data with verifiable
evidences [123]. Auditing of computations and data produces details of actions taken by mappers
and reducers over data. Specifically, auditing investigates accounted data and provides verifiable
evidences of what, when, initiated by whom, and how actions happened over which part of the
data. An auditing process involves three parties, the first is data providers, the second is public
clouds, and the third is the auditor who performs auditing. Hence, it is required to restrict data
with fine-grained access controls, because an attacker who impersonates a legitimate auditor may
understand the computation (better than the auditor) and reveal sensitive data.
3.3. Adversarial Models for MapReduce Security
There are numerous possible adversarial models in security, and thus, we will concentrate only on
a limited set of adversarial models involved in MapReduce security.
Honest-but-Curious adversary. An honest-but-curious adversary executes a MapReduce job
correctly and does not interfere with the job as well as data; however, it performs some extra
computations for understanding the whole data and the job. For example, a public cloud does not
interfere a MapReduce job and data, but it can observe the job and data. This type of adversary is also
relevant to Privacy in MapReduce, see Section 4.3.
Malicious adversary. A malicious adversary can execute any computation for stealing, corrupting,
and modifying data as well as the original MapReduce computation [96, 38, 125, 123]. For example,
a malicious mapper or reducer may not perform a computation or may provide wrong outputs (to
users).
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Malicious adversaries in distributed settings, like MapReduce, are divided into two types,
as follows: (i) non-collusive malicious adversary: a non-collusive malicious adversary works
independently, and hence, provides wrong outputs without consulting other malicious adversaries.
In this case, if an identical task is assigned to two nodes and at least one of them is non-collusive, then
the malicious behavior of the node can be easily detected by comparing their outputs; (ii) collusive
malicious adversary: a collusive malicious adversary communicates with all the other malicious
adversaries before providing outputs [115, 117, 118]. In this case, when a collusive (malicious)
adversary is assigned a task, it consults other collusive adversaries to find if they are assigned an
identical task. If yes, then all the collusive adversaries provide an identical wrong output, which
make it harder to detect them.
Note that honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries are assumed to be
polynomial-computationally-bounded adversaries, i.e., the adversaries cannot perform brute-force
attack.
Knowledgeable adversary. A knowledgeable adversary is assumed to be knowledgeable with respect
to the cloud structure, MapReduce algorithms, and implementation of mappers-reducers. In other
words, a knowledgeable adversary, which may be the cloud provider or any user, is considered to be
capable of leveraging any security (and privacy) threats in the framework.
Network and nodes access adversary. A network and nodes access adversary is assumed to have
an access to network and nodes, though it does not have privileged accounts on the nodes. Privileged
account on the nodes can be compared to the adversary owning the cloud, which is a situation where
cloud user cannot be protected.
3.4. Proposed Solutions for Securing MapReduce
In this section, we provide a brief description of some existing security solutions for MapReduce.
Reviewed security algorithms, protocols and frameworks are summarized in Table 1.
3.4.1. Authentication, authorization, and access control based approaches
An authentication mechanism for Hadoop using Kerberos and three special types of tokens,
namely delegation token, block access token, and job token, is presented [82, 34]. The communication
between a user and HDFS is divided into two parts: (i) a user accesses NameNode using Hadoop’s
remote procedure call (RPC) libraries, and all RPCs connect using Simple Authentication and Security
Layer that uses Kerberos, DIGEST-MD5, or a delegation token and (ii) a user accesses DataNodes
using a streaming socket connection that is secured using a block access token. The working of the
three types of tokens is as follows:
Kerberos
NameNode
Request for executing 
a  MapReduce job
Delegation Token
(a) Delegation token.
NameNode
DataNode
DataNode
DataNode
(b) Block access token.
Figure 5: Authentication to Hadoop using Kerberos and two types of tokens.
Delegation token. A delegation token is a secret key between a user and NameNode. After
authenticating a user, a delegation token is generated by NameNode using Kerberos, and the token
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is used for subsequent authentication of the user by NameNode without involving Kerberos; see
Figure 5a.
Block access token. A block access token provides authentication policies to DataNodes by passing
authorization information from NameNode to DataNodes and is generated by NameNode using a
symmetric-key scheme where NameNode and all of the DataNodes share a secret key; see Figure 5b.
When a user wants to access a file in HDFS, it requests NameNode for block ids and locations of the
file. In response, NameNode sends block ids and the locations with a block access token for each
block, if NameNode verifies authenticity and authority of the user. The user sends the block id with
the block access token to the corresponding DataNode, and the DataNode verifies the block access
token before allowing access to that block.
Job token. A job token is generated by JobTracker in the form of a secret key, when a MapReduce
job is submitted. JobTraker stores the job token for each job as a part of the job and distributes it to
TaskTrackers. The job token is used to authenticate tasks at TaskTrakers.
MapReduce paradigm itself is security agnostic, and this lead to an initial version of Hadoop
implementation to have no built-in security mechanism. However, as MapReduce in general and,
specifically, Hadoop gained wide-spread usage, the need for security has become more and more
acute. This led to a number of recent projects, which we will review next, trying to add different
types of security aspects to Hadoop.
Apache Knox. Apache Knox [3] is a stateless reverse proxy framework that provides gateway-level
security and a single access point to a single Hadoop cluster or multiple Hadoop clusters. Apache
Knox provides a monitoring of the system, authentication, federation of authenticated users,
authorization, and auditing. It has several advantages, such as: integration with enterprise identity
management solutions, it hides details of Hadoop cluster deployment, simplifies the number of
services that clients need to interact with, limits numbers of access point to Hadoop clusters, scales
linearly by adding more Knox nodes as the load increases.
Apache Sentry. Apache Sentry [7] is a system for fine-grained, multi-tenant administration, and
role-based authorization of an access to data and metadata in a Hadoop cluster. Apache Sentry can
be integrated in relational data model for Apache Hive, Cloudera Impala, and hierarchical data model
used by Apache Solr. Sentry allows access control at the server, database, table, and view scopes.
It also allows different privileges for select, insert, create, and modify. Sentry defines
policies for accessing resources. On receiving a request from a user, Hive/Impala/Solr asks Sentry
for validating the request. Sentry builds a map of privileges allowed for the requesting user and then
determines whether the given request should be allowed, and then allows or prohibits the user access
based on decisions by Sentry.
Apache Ranger. Apache Ranger [4] provides a centralized and comprehensive platform for securing
Hadoop. Specially, Apache Ranger provides: (i) authentication: by Kerberos and secured by Apache
Knox, (ii) authorization, (iii) fine-grained access control: by role-based access control, attribute-based
access control, etc., (iv) auditing of HDFS, Hive, and HBase, and (v) data protection: by wire
encryption, volume encryption, and file/column encryption.
Project Rhino. Project Rhino [5], an initiative by Cloudera and Intel, is an open source for enhancing
existing data protection in the Hadoop stack. Specifically, Project Rhino provides framework support
for encryption, key management, and a common authentication-authorization module with single
sign on. Recently, Project Rhino added cell level encryption and fine-grained access control to HBase
0.98, and encryption to data at-rest (data stored on persistent storage) in Apache Hadoop. Note that
data encryption in Hadoop requires encryption of data at-rest and in-transit; however, except Project
Rhino, most Hadoop components provide encryption for data in-transit only.
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Apache Accumulo. Apache Accumulo [6] is not a security framework like Apache Knox,
Apache Sentry, Apache Ranger, and Project Rhino. However, Apache Accumulo improves Google
BigTable [30] design by introducing cell-based access control, which emphasizes us to mention
Apache Accumulo in this paper. Apache Accumulo stores a logical combination of security labels
that must be satisfied at query time in order for keys and values to be returned as part of a user request.
This allows users to see only those keys and values for which they are authorized. Apache Accumulo
is built on top of Apache Hadoop, Zookeeper, and Thrift.
Table 1: Summary of security algorithms, protocols, and frameworks for MapReduce.
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[82], [34] X X S7 X
Apache Knox [3] X X X M8
Apache Sentry [4] X X S
Apache Ranger [4] X X X X M
Project Rhino [5] X X X X S X
Apache Accumulo [6] X S
Airavat [92] X X X S X
Khaled et al. [57] X
Vigiles [109] X X
GuardMR [107] X X
G-Hadoop [135] X X X X X
SecDM [97] X X X X X X M X X
iBigTable [119] X X X
Lin et al. [64] X S X9 X10
SAPSC [96] X M X
ClusterBFT [99] X S, H11 X
Moca et al. [76] X X X
SecureMR [118] X X X X S X X X X X
AccountableMR [123] X X X S
VIAF [115] X X S X
CCMR [116] X X M X
IntegrityMR [117] X X M X
VAWS [39] X X S X
Hatman [58] X S X12
TrustMR [108] X S
TS-TRV [38] X X S X
Log-based [125] X X X X X S X
Watermarking based [53, 37] X X S X
Accountable MapReduce
(RBAC) [110]
X X X X X S
Airavat. Airavat [92] is a system that provides mandatory access control together with differential
privacy for data protection. Airavat is the first system that provides a complete solution for data
privacy and secure computations in MapReduce environments. To ensure that untrusted mappers do
not leak data outside the cluster, Airavat uses mandatory control system to disallow direct access of
7S: Single cloud.
8M: Multiple clouds.
9Partially.
10Partially.
11H: Hybrid cloud.
12By assumptions of the algorithms.
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mappers to the data and to the network. The system is based on Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)13
and requires a unified deployment of the secure Linux system on all the nodes of the cluster.
Vigiles. Vigiles [109] provides a fine-grained access control mechanism for read operations in
MapReduce without modifying computations. Vigiles works as a middleware architecture that stays
between untrusted users and MapReduce environment; see Figure 6. Since Vigiles supports only
read operation, it is required to remove sensitive data from outputs (of the read operation). A system
administrator manages HDFS and creates access control filters, which provide only authorized data
to users, based on the given configurations. Access control filters are used to remove sensitive data
by following a 3-phase procedure: decompose, fetch, and action. When users provide MapReduce
computations, Vigiles executes them by following access control policies and remove sensitive data
from the outputs. On the negative side, ad-hoc data types, append and delete operations are not
allowed in Vigiles. Nevertheless, it does not require any modification of a MapReduce computation.
Generate and configure  access control (AC) 
filters by the system administrator
MapReduce
Fine-grained access control predicates
A user
Vigiles
Data
Untrusted 
domain
Trusted domain
MapReduce 
job
Figure 6: Vigiles access control mechanism.
GuardMR. GuardMR [107] allows ad-hoc data types and provides access to the record dynamically.
GuardMR is composed of two main components: (i) access control module performs the
administrative functions that allow to add new data types and preprocessing functions after a proper
security analysis; and (ii) reference monitor enforces specified security policies to the underlying
MapReduce system after consulting the access control module, resulting in an authorized view of
data.
In [57], an access control and enforcement policy based architecture for Resource Description
Framework (RDF) [61, 55] is proposed, where the system administrator generates an access token
for securely accessing data based on the request of users. The token prevents access to the entire
data. Six types of secure data accesses are suggested: predicate data access, subject and object data
access with or without predicates, and subject model level access. Since the format of RDF is not
suitable for a MapReduce computation, a two-layered system is also proposed, where the first layer
(data processing layer) converts RDF toN -Triple format [29], and the second layer (query processing
layer) is responsible for executing a MapReduce computation. The query processing layer provides
outputs regarding an access token. The query processing layer first rewrites a query that satisfies an
access token, then performs a MapReduce job according to the rewritten query, and finally performs
one or more additional MapReduce jobs to remove sensitive data from outputs according to the access
token.
Authentication of malicious users based on storing communication between user and NameNode,
and between user and DataNodes is suggested in [125]. The approach stores IP addresses, port
13http://selinuxproject.org/
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numbers, and socket connection related system calls. In [135], a security model for geographically
distributed Hadoop, called G-Hadoop [114], is presented. The model uses two types of tokens, namely
proxy token and slave token for the purpose of authentication. A proxy token (contains its expiration
time, identity of certificate authority (CA) server, the public key of the master process, and a random
message generated by the CA server) is used by slave nodes for authenticating the master process. A
slave token (contains identity of the CA server and the public key of the corresponding slave node)
is used by the master process for authenticating a slave node. In [111], the authors suggested a
honey-pot-based mechanism for detecting an unauthorized data access. Honey data is deliberately
produced and mixed in the original data. However, an authorized user never accesses the honey-pot
data during a MapReduce job. Since attackers access all the parts of data, it leads to an alarm with a
high probability.
3.4.2. An encryption-decryption based approach for data transmission
A secure data transmission and security storage of the data (reviewed in Section 4) are critical
issues when mappers and reducers that reside on two different clouds share data.
SecDM. Secure Data Migration (SecDM) [97] provides a secure way for data transmission among
mappers-reducers at two different clouds. The two master processes, which are located at two
different clouds, create a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connection between them, then send message
authentication code with a timestamp and negotiate a random key. After authentication of two master
processes is completed, mappers or reducers receive the locations of data in the other cloud. Data
transmission (among mappers-reducers at two clouds) is carried out using the negotiated key, where
encrypted data is transmitted with a hash value of data and a message authentication code, which
prevents tampering.
3.4.3. Approaches for security and integrity of storage
iBigTable. An enhancement of BigTable, called iBigTable [119], ensures the integrity of data using
decentralized authenticated data structures. Two approaches, see Figures 7a and 7b, are suggested
for storing authenticated data that is used to verify the integrity of data. Both the approaches build
a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [75] based authenticated data structure for the root tablet, the metadata
tablets, and the user tables. MHT allows efficient and secure verification of contents of large-scale
data, where non-leaf nodes are labelled with the hash of the labels of their child nodes.
Root tablet
Metadata
tablet User table
Data owner
(a) The first (centralized) approach.
Root tablet
Metadata
tablet User table
Data owner
(b) The second (distributed) approach.
Figure 7: Merkle Hash Tree based authenticated storage of data structures in iBigTable.
In the first (centralized) approach, each user table and the metadata tablet stores its root hash of
the authenticated data structure at the metadata tablets and the root tablet, respectively; see Figure 7a.
The root hash of the root tablet is stored at the user-end. Whenever any data is updated at a user
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table, the corresponding authenticated data structure is also updated. An update of the authenticated
data structure at a user table requires updates of the corresponding authenticated data structures at
the metadata tablet, the root tablet, and the user-end. Such updates of authenticated data structures
decrease the performance of BigTable and require the involvement of the user, the metadata tablets,
and the root tablet. In the second (distributed) approach, a user stores the root hash of each tablet and
each user table, see Figure 7b; and storing the root hash at the user-end increases the performance of
iBigTable. In addition, it is not required to store the root hash of the authenticated data structures at
the higher level.
In order to verify the integrity of data, three rounds of communication between a client and the
servers are required. The first round requires communication between the user and the root tablet; the
second round requires communication between the user and the metadata tablet; and the third round
requires communication between the user and the user table. In each round, a tablet server generates
and sends a verification object, VO, which contains a set of hashes, for the data sent to the user. On
receiving data and the corresponding VO, the user verifies the integrity of the received data. VOs
from the root tablet and the metadata tablet allow accessing the metadata tablet and the user table,
respectively.
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Figure 8: A hybrid encryption scheme used to store data in HDFS.
HDFS-RSA and HDFS-Pairing. In order to store data in a confidential manner in HDFS, two
approaches based on hybrid encryption are suggested in [64]. The hybrid encryption approaches, see
Figure 8, use a block cipher and a stream cipher (see Chapter 3 of [120] for block ciphers and stream
ciphers). Data is divided into fixed-sized blocks, d1, d2, . . . , dn, according to a block cipher, and the
remaining part of data becomes block dn+1. The blocks d1, d2, . . . , dn are encrypted using a random
key k and a block cipher, and the block dn+1 is encrypted using the key k and a stream cipher. The key,
k, is, then, encrypted using a public key scheme. The first approach, called HDFS-RSA, uses the RSA
encryption scheme and AES, and the second approach, called HDFS-pairing, uses a pairing-based
encryption scheme and AES. However, both the approaches are suitable for applications with a few
write and many read operations.
SAPSC. Security Architecture of Private Storage Cloud based on HDFS (SAPSC) [96] provides an
architecture for ensuring security of data stored in HDFS by data isolation service, secure intra-cloud
data migration service, and secure inter-cloud migration service; see Figure 9. These three services
are dependent on five major services of a distributed files system, as follows: (i) fault-tolerant service,
(ii) storage service, (iii) configuration of the system and management of the nodes, called node
services, (iv) data transmission service, and (v) load balance service.
Data isolation services are invoked when a user reads/writes a file and are responsible for secure
storage of data in HDFS and secure operations on data. Data isolation service is based on access policy
management, access decision-authorization, access protocol security, and private data encryption.
Secure intra-cloud data migration services do a secure data replication for the fault-tolerant service
and transfer of data involved in a job, due to the load balance service or the node service. Secure
inter-cloud data migration services do a secure data migration among clouds through the transmission
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Figure 9: SAPSC architecture for data security.
service. In addition, three security policies are defined, as follows: (i) a flexible access control policy
based on role-based access control, (ii) a label-based intra-cloud data replicating and restructuring
policy, and (ii) a temporary-ticket based parallel inter-cloud data transmission policy.
3.4.4. Approaches for result verification and accounting
Several approaches for result verification are proposed based on redundancy of data and
computations, trust management, and log analysis, which will be presented in this section.
• Redundancy based approach
A redundancy based approach replicates all or some of the tasks to multiple nodes and checks
their outputs to find inconsistencies. Several approaches based on redundancy of tasks are reviewed
below.
ClusterBFT. ClusterBFT [99] uses the Byzantine Failure Tolerant (BFT) [60] replication technique
to cope with a situation where the cloud is trusted but there are potentially malicious nodes or users in
a cluster. BFT replication is used for computational results verification and for overcoming untrusted,
possibly malicious nodes. BFT replication techniques perform calculations in parallel on multiple
replicas, then compare all the produced outputs to identify erratic behavioral nodes and decide a
correct output based on a majority vote. However, current BFT replication techniques were developed
for stand-alone servers and do not suit cloud-based computations, where data flow among different
nodes and a computation consists of a number of stages to be performed on different nodes, as it is
done in MapReduce. In order to overcome this gap, ClusterBFT algorithm adopts BFT replication
for highly-scalable, distributed and high-granularity cloud computations. The algorithm identifies
an optimal, according to heuristic function, subgraph of the computational flow that is verified
by multiple replicas. The rest of the nodes participating in data flow are not replicated to avoid
multiplication of verification messages and performance overhead. To reduce the volume of replicated
data in verification phase, the algorithm uses digital digest of the data. In addition, the algorithm
allows fault isolation and identification, i.e., identification of components that continuously return
incorrect outputs and removing them from the job scheduling.
SecureMR. A decentralized replication-based integrity verification framework, called
SecureMR [118], ensures the integrity of data as well as computations, and prevents repudiation,
DoS, and replay attacks. SecureMR replicates some map and reduce tasks, and assigns them to
different mappers and reducers, i.e., a map (or reduce) task is executed by more than one worker.
The proposed framework consists of five security components, as follows: Secure Manager, Secure
Scheduler, Secure Task Executor, Secure Committer, and Secure Verifier; see Figure 10a. The Secure
Manager and the Secure Scheduler are deployed at the master process and perform task duplication,
secure task assignment, and commitment-based consistency checking. The communication between
the master process and mappers is carried out using the commitment protocol. The communication
between the master process and reducers, and between mappers and reducers is done using the
verification protocol.
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Figure 10: SecureMR framework, the commitment protocol, and the verification protocol.
Commitment protocol. The commitment protocol, see Figure 10b, avoids inspection of intermediate
outputs by the master process and allows mappers to send a commit message with a signed hash value
for each of its intermediate outputs (HPi) to the master process. Note that in the commitment protocol,
the master process assigns a map task to a mapper in a secure manner using an encrypted message
(signed, sig, by the master process and encrypted using the public key of the mapper, Kpublicm ) that
holds the location of data, DataLoc, and identity of the map task, IDmap.
Verification protocol. In the verification protocol, see Figure 10c, reducers verify intermediate outputs
and check the signed hash value that was submitted to the master process. The master process assigns
a reduce task to a reducer in a secure manner using an encrypted message (encrypted using the public
key of the reducer, Kpublicr ) that holds the location of intermediate outputs, LPi , and identity of the
reduce task, IDreduce. After that the master process sends a notify message to the verifier of each
reducer, which includes the mapper’s address (ADM ), Kpublicm , IDMap, HPi , and a ticket TicketM
(which includes Kpublicr , IDMap, LPi , and IDreduce). The reducers ask intermediate outputs from the
mapper, and the mapper sends data once it verifies the request. The verifier at the reducer verifies the
response from the mapper, and in case of inconstancy, the verifier sends two signatures as evidences
of an inconsistency to the master process.
In order to check the integrity of a MapReduce computation on a Desktop Grid [43, 20], a
replication based approach is suggested in [76], where reducers check results produced by mappers
and the master process checks results produced by reducers. In addition, a MD5-based scheme is
given to check outputs of mappers against a predefined digest code and Map function. The master
process computes digest-codes for each split, and the digest-codes are sent to reducers. Mappers
process input data splits, compute the code, and attach it with intermediate outputs. Reducers check
the codes attached with intermediate outputs and the code received from the master process. If both
the codes are different, then intermediate outputs are rejected.
Overhead issues. All the redundancy-based approaches replicate all or some of the tasks, and such
a replication increases the communication cost and computation time of a MapReduce job. This
becomes more important in non-free public clouds, where users are tariffed for the communication
cost and computation time. An additional drawback of redundancy-based approaches is a difficulty
to find a collusive malicious, as collusive attackers might provide an identical incorrect answer; thus
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bypassing the comparison-based verification.
• Redundancy with trust based approaches
Redundancy with trust based approaches use replication techniques for identification of
inconsistencies, and then, use trusted workers for verification of results. Trusted workers might be
located in a private cloud, in a different pool on the same cloud, or in any other trusted location. Also,
it is assumed that the number of trusted workers is limited and does not allow execution of all tasks.
Accountable MapReduce. In order to ensure the integrity of MapReduce computations, Accountable
MapReduce [123] verifies each map and reduce tasks by reexecuting them at a group of trusted
workers. However, the reexecution of each task is not computationally efficient in detecting malicious
mappers or reducers. Hence, the Accountable MapReduce also supports reexecution of some of the
map and reduce tasks by a group of trusted workers.
VIAF. Verification-based Integrity Assurance Framework (VIAF) [115] builds trust between the
master process and each of the mappers, based on replication of tasks and a quiz-based system. The
VIAF framework introduces a new task called verification task that verifies outputs of the map tasks.
The verification task, the reduce task, and the master process execute on a set of trusted workers;
and the map task executes on untrusted workers. In the VIAF framework, each map task executes
on two workers, and each worker accumulates a sufficient amount of credits by passing verification
(quiz-based) process.
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Figure 11: VIAF framework.
In the VIAF framework, the master process assigns each map task to two different workers; see
step 1 in Figure 11. After completion of the map task, both the workers return hash values of the
results to the master process; see step 2 in Figure 11. If the hash values are different, then the master
process concludes that one of them is a malicious (non-collusive) worker, and hence, assigns the same
task to two different workers. On the other hand, if both the hash values are identical, the master
process stores the results of the two workers and the task information in their history caches; see step
3 in Figure 11. After that, the master process may execute the verification task at the verifier in a
non-deterministic manner (with a certain probability, called verification probability) to verify these
consistent results of both the workers; see step 4 in Figure 11. The master process concludes that the
two workers are collusive workers when the verification task provides different results. On receiving
an identical result from the verification task, both the workers pass one quiz and accumulate one
credit; see step 5 in Figure 11. When both the workers have an adequate and an identical amount of
credits, they become trusted workers, and their results are passed to reducers through a result buffer;
see steps 6 and 7 in Figure 11.
CCMR. The framework, Cross Cloud MapReduce (CCMR) [116], extends the VIAF [115]
framework by executing a MapReduce computation over a private cloud and a public cloud. The
master process and the verification task are executed at the private cloud. In the map phase, each
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original map task is replicated with a replication probability, and each identical result is verified using
the quiz-based approach with a verification probability. In the reduce phase, each reduce task is
divided into multiple sub-tasks; and each sub-task is also replicated with a replication probability,
and each identical result of sub-tasks is verified using the quiz-based approach with a verification
probability.
IntegrityMR. IntegrityMR [117] extends the CCMR framework [116] by executing a MapReduce
job on a private cloud and multiple public clouds, where the map and reduce tasks are executed on
different public clouds. In addition, an invariant construction and checking method for applications
written in Pig Latin [81] is also suggested, where an original script is transformed into another
equivalent script. In the transformed script, a map task is substituted by two map tasks that work on
some overlapped inputs and provide an identical result as an invariant of the map task after processing
overlapped inputs. In order to achieve high accuracy, the reduce task executes on the private cloud,
detects invariant violation, and restores results from the two map tasks, if they provide identical
results.
VAWS. Verification-based Anti-collusive Worker Scheduling (VAWS) system [39] improves the
scalability of the VIAF framework by removing the bottleneck from the verifier and by enhancing the
ability of the verification frameworks to deal with collusive attacks. Majority vote based systems have
an inherent flaw when malicious attackers comprise a majority of computational nodes for specific
work items. This situation might occur even if the amount of collusive malicious attackers in the
cluster is small in comparison to the entire cluster size. The VAWS system deals with both challenges
by separating reducers and the master process into trusted domain under the assumption that the
majority of MapReduce jobs are mappers. Mapper jobs are executed on two nodes and the results are
compared. Nodes that agree on results are considered to be temporary consistent. The algorithm then
builds and maintains a sub-graph of consistent nodes. Nodes that disagree in outputs in any execution
are then paired with other nodes, both consistent and not consistent, in order to identify malicious
nodes. While the system has a low overhead of verification and experiments successfully identify
malicious nodes, it has a big disadvantage of allowing rounds of computations with incorrect results.
This happens when both nodes that execute an identical job are malicious and continue to happen
until the malicious nodes are correctly identified.
Hatman. Another framework based on replication of tasks, Hatman (HAdoop Trust MANager) [58],
builds a trust level among different clouds, and NameNode keeps trust levels of DataNodes. A
MapReduce job is distributed over kn workers, where k is a replication factor and n is the size of
a group that process an assigned job independently. In other words, k non-identical groups of n
workers in each group process a job independently. If the system does not contain any malicious
worker, then all the k groups provide an identical result. On the other hand, when the master process
receives different results, the master process chooses the results of trusted workers. Initially, all the
nodes are assumed to be trusted and their relative confidence is also assumed to be uniform (i.e., 1
n
).
However, workers decrease their trust and relative confidence in case of compromises. The trust of a
worker i towards a worker j is proportional to the percentage of jobs shared by i and j on which i’s
group agreed with j’s group, and a worker i relative confidence is the percentage of assessments of j
that have been voiced by i.
TrustMR. In order to detect attacks with a high probability while minimizing the overhead,
TrustMR [108] decomposes MapReduce tasks into smaller computations by means of aspect-oriented
programming and replicates a subset of these task to verify the integrity of computations. TrustMR
initiates multiple replicated map tasks on the replicated input splits. Some outputs of the map phase
are randomly selected at runtime, and replicated map tasks only generate these key-value pairs. The
results of replicated and original map tasks are verified at a map verifier by using a voting system.
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The results of replicated and original reduce tasks are also verified in the same manner at a reduce
verifier.
TS-TRV. Trusted Sampling-based Third-party Result Verification (TS-TRV) [38] performs random
sampling and constructs a Merkle tree at a trusted third-party, called verifier. The use of a Merkle
tree reduces the amount of data that has to be sent to the verifier. A local Merkle tree is constructed
by taking outputs of mappers as leaf nodes, when mappers finish the task. After that a global Merkle
tree is constructed by the master process, where all root values submitted by mappers become leaf
nodes, and the root value of the tree is sent to the verifier. The verifier randomly takes some number
of (challenging) inputs from the global tree and sends them to corresponding mappers. On receiving
(challenging) inputs, mappers construct responses in the form of a path to the root node of the local
Merkle tree. The verifier also constructs the global Merkle tree using the responses sent by mappers
and compares the values of the new root node against the old root node’s value (to find a malicious
mapper).
Overhead issues. Most of the approaches check the trust of the workers before the execution of a
MapReduce computation, which causes an overhead in addition to replication overhead. For instance,
a malicious worker can behave well for a long period of time to gain the trust of the master process
and may attack only after that. Most of the above approaches do not deal well with such sophisticated
attackers. In addition, even replication of some tasks together with usage of trusted workers still
cannot guarantee the detection of all the malicious mappers and reducers.
• Log analysis and watermarking-based approaches
In order to find malicious workers and a malicious update in HDFS, an approach based on log
analysis is suggested in [125]. The approach verifies the integrity and the correctness of a MapReduce
job without modifying the original MapReduce job. Four types of logs are recorded, as follows:
(i) logs of interaction between a user and NameNode and logs of interaction between a user and
DataNode, (ii) logs of HDFS access, (iii) logs of interaction between HDFS and mappers-reducers,
and (iv) logs of the Map and the Reduce phases. These logs are compared with some pre-defined
systems and job invariants to find malicious workers.
Watermarking uses the concept of a watermark that is a kind of indistinguishable marker
embedded in data. An approach based on watermark (or probe) injection is given in [53], which
is able to detect malicious and lazy (a worker process that can either drop a task at any time or start a
task not from beginning) workers. The approach consists of four steps: watermark generation, which
generates some watermarks and inserts them into original data (before the start of a MapReduce job),
execution of a MapReduce job, verification, which is done by the user by comparing outputs of all
the processed watermarks by a MapReduce job and preprocessed outputs of all the watermarks, and
recovery, which removes injected watermarks from outputs, once the output passes the consistency
check at the verification step. The approach works well mostly for text-intensive tasks, e.g., inverted
index, word count, distributed grep, and log data processing, while being hard to apply to other types
of input data. A method for verifying outputs of PageRank algorithm based on random sampling,
called in-degree weighted sampling, is also suggested in [53], which proposes a way for verifying
outputs of tasks where watermark injection is not possible.
Another watermark based approach is suggested in [37], which is also able to detect malicious
workers. Accountable MapReduce [123] also supports watermarking-based detection of malicious
workers. In Accountable MapReduce, some predefined watermarks are inserted into the original
input data, and the outputs of the map phase, the inputs to the reduce phase, and the outputs of the
reduce phase are verified.
A different approach was proposed and implemented in [110]. The paper suggested
purpose-based access control (PBAC) (see [27, 28] for more details) and implemented it over Hadoop
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MapReduce. The set of purposes is organized in hierarchical tree, where an edge between two
purposes represents relations (specialization and generalization) between them. The system modifies
MapReduce jobs and records to include purposes. An access to specific data record is granted if the
purposes specified by the security policy include or imply the purpose for the accessing of the data.
It is assumed that when Hadoop system is deployed, the hierarchy of purposes is set in place and
security policies are defined. A user submitting a job to Hadoop cluster then declares access policy,
which is then checked by the AccountableMR system. The system clearly enhances the native security
of Hadoop and allows much more fine-grained and sophisticated access control to the data. However,
AccountableMR system also requires a considerable effort both in the initial setup of Hadoop cluster
and from ongoing work of users.
Restrictive issues. Watermarking-based approaches are better than redundancy based approaches in
terms of the workload on the framework, because these approaches do not re-execute all/some map
and reduce tasks. However, watermarking approaches cannot be applied to all input data types or
even to specific usages of the data. This considerably limits practical applications of such methods.
In addition, the watermarking-based approaches do not guarantee finding all the malicious mappers
and reducers, due to the fact that not all the data splits contain watermarks.
To summarize this section, there exist solutions to some of the security problems of MapReduce,
however, more research is needed in order to provide effective solutions, which will be discussed
briefly in Conclusions section (Section 5).
4. Privacy Aspects in MapReduce
Privacy ensures that sensitive data is not exposed to untrusted users and trespassers (i.e., cloud
providers, other data providers, users of MapReduce, or adversaries). Notice that the data providers
are interested in allowing some sorts of computations on the data, however, there is also a requirement
to preserve breach of sensitive data. Sensitive data in this case is case specific and might be personal
records with identifier information (personally identifiable information PII), organization specific
information and etc. In this section, we present a brief summary of privacy aspects in general cloud
computing, privacy requirements in MapReduce, and then, review some existing solutions for privacy
in MapReduce.
4.1. Privacy Challenges in MapReduce Computing
Cloud computing and the deployment of MapReduce on public clouds present a new set of
challenges in privacy of data. Here, we describe privacy challenges of cloud computing in the context
of MapReduce and divide them into a few cases according to adversarial behaviors of public clouds
and users.
Data privacy protection from adversarial cloud providers. A user may keep private data in public
clouds due to its volume or ease of computations on public clouds, while aiming to preserve the
privacy of data. In this setting, we consider an adversarial cloud provider that can observe users’
data and MapReduce code; but should not change users’ queries or results. Ensuring privacy in the
presence of an adversarial cloud provider who can modify or delete data and computations is an
insurmountable challenge. The goal of privacy in the presence of adversarial clouds is to minimize
data leakage to the cloud provider while allowing users to perform operations on data. The majority
of the work in this area is based on encryption of users’ data and finding a way to allow operations on
encrypted data in the cloud.
Protection of data from adversarial users. Data providers allow users to perform MapReduce
jobs on their data via cloud providers, but also wish to control and preserve privacy of data. For
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example, while the average annual income can be calculated, the income of that specific individual
should remain secret. Solutions to this use-case are based on anonymization of data (i.e., by dropping
sensitive values that can identify individuals), by adding random noise to data, or computational
results to hide the real values, (e.g., using differential privacy).
Multiusers on a single public cloud. A public cloud provider and a data provider should allow
several users to perform their computations without data leakage. For example, an organization may
keep all its data in public clouds, and several users process and access some parts of the data for
which they are authorized. A hospital may store data of all the patients on clouds. There are several
groups of users, e.g., doctors, insurance companies, patients, and pharmaceutical research companies,
which should access some parts of data. In this case, privacy framework has to ensure that each user
is able to access all the required data but also that the users cannot access parts of data for which they
are not authorized for. This is usually solved by authentication and authorization mechanisms as was
explained in Section 3.4. The situation becomes more complex as data is provided by a number of
data providers, each one with different privacy requirements. In such public clouds, an adversarial
user may also access another user’s data by injecting a malicious mapper or reducer that exploits
existing security issues.
Various solutions are suggested for privacy of cloud computing. However, not all existing
solutions for privacy of the cloud computing can be used for privacy in MapReduce, due to a number
of additional constraints and challenges in MapReduce (presented in Section 2), thus requiring
adaptation or change in those solutions.
4.2. Privacy Requirements in MapReduce
MapReduce inherently decouples data providers, cloud providers, and users that execute queries
over data. Referring to the cloud structure depicted in Figure 4, data providers upload data to the cloud
provider, and cloud users perform queries on data. However, despite separation between different
entities, ensuring privacy in those settings is still a challenging task. Here, we provide requirements
of privacy in MapReduce framework, deployed on the hybrid cloud or the public cloud.
Protection of data providers. In a setting where data is uploaded to the cloud by various data
providers, each data provider might have a different privacy requirements. The cloud provider has to
ensure that those privacy requirements are met even in the presence of adversarial users. Moreover,
different data providers might require a different privacy level for various data sets. The privacy
framework should allow adaptation of privacy levels for those requirements.
Untrusted cloud providers. As an adversarial cloud provider can perform any computation on data
for revealing data, modifying data, and producing wrong outputs, data has to be protected from cloud
providers. In addition to protecting the data from cloud providers, privacy framework has to be able
to protect the performed computations as well. As an example, consider a user querying for specific
information. Even if the data results are not released to the cloud provider, it is possible to learn the
intent of the user from observing performed computations. In terms of MapReduce, it may require
mappers and reducers to work on encrypted data (see Section 4.4).
Utilization and privacy tradeoff. A data provider can encrypt data in a way that no information can
be learnt from it. However, this will also prevent the user from performing some computations on the
data, and thus, decreases utilization of MapReduce. As such, MapReduce privacy framework has to
provide maximum possible utilization while still preserving data privacy according to data providers’
requirements.
Efficiency. In most of the public clouds, users are tariffed for usage and storage. Hence, the privacy
framework has to be efficient in terms of CPU and memory consumption, and in the amount of storage
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required. If the privacy framework provides high overhead, it could be more cost-effective to perform
computations on the private cloud, where physical security solves privacy issues.
4.3. Adversarial Models for MapReduce Privacy
All the adversarial models mentioned in Section 3.3 are applicable to MapReduce privacy with
small changes. Below, we explain the adaptation required in the definitions of adversaries and how
they can be applied in privacy settings.
Honest-but-Curious adversary. This type of adversary mostly applies to cloud providers. Curious
cloud providers can breach the privacy of data and MapReduce computations very easily, since the
whole cluster is under the control of cloud providers, which have all types of privileged access to data
and computing nodes. It is important to note that in reality curious cloud providers are not necessary
adversaries by choice, but rather might be compliant by court law, regulations, and governmental
requests.14
Malicious adversary. This type of adversary applies to a user that tries to learn, modify, or delete
information from the data by issuing various queries. In general, cloud providers are not assumed
to be malicious, as assuring privacy with malicious cloud providers requires a high level of privacy
measures that considerably reduce the utilization of the framework.
Knowledgeable adversary. A knowledgeable adversary applies to both a cloud provider and a user,
who are trying to learn, modify, or delete information. Knowledgeable adversary is assumed to have a
complete knowledge of MapReduce framework, the cloud structure, and is able to use any algorithm
or cryptography drawback. In other words, there is no “security by obscurity.”
Network and node adversary. As opposite to the network and nodes access adversary in security
adversarial models, a cloud provider working as a network and node adversary has all the privileged
access to computing nodes and the entire cloud infrastructure. A real-world example of such adversary
is a cloud provider employee that breaches sensitive information most clearly shown by Edward
Snowden case. It is impossible to hide any MapReduce computation or data from this type of
adversary [90].
4.4. Proposed Solutions for Privacy in MapReduce
This section summarizes some existing solutions for privacy in MapReduce. We categorize
privacy algorithms in MapReduce into three types, as follows: (i) algorithms for ensuring privacy
in hybrid clouds, (ii) algorithms ensuring data privacy in the presence of adversarial users, and (iii)
algorithms for ensuring privacy in the presence of adversarial cloud providers. A comparison of
privacy algorithms, protocols, and frameworks for MapReduce is given in Table 2.
4.4.1. Data privacy in hybrid clouds
An increasing growth of data within organizations and lower maintenance costs are two factors
that force data processing on public clouds instead of private clouds. Despite the change in the
location of data processing, the need for privacy preservation of sensitive data remains identical.
Thus, it is beneficial to process data based on sensitivity on the organization’s private cloud and
public clouds. Since MapReduce is designed for a single cloud, hybrid cloud based MapReduce
computations require modification of MapReduce framework in order to deal with privacy (and
security) issues on public clouds. In this section, we review some MapReduce privacy frameworks
for the hybrid cloud computing model.
14http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-admits-patriot-act-can-access-eu-based-cloud-data/
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(c) Vertical partitioning.
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(d) Hybrid.
Figure 12: Four execution models in HybrEx.
Table 2: Summary of privacy algorithms, protocols, and frameworks for MapReduce.
Algorithms/Protocols/
Frameworks
Privacy of
data providers
Protection from adversarial Approach Cloud
structureUser Cloud
HybrEx [59] X X Data separation H15
Sedic [129] X X Data separation H
Tagged-MapReduce [127]X X Data separation H
SEMROD [80] X X Data separation H
Prometheus [138] X X Data separation H
PPL [132, 133] X Data anonymization S16
Airavat [92] X X Differential privacy S
PRISM [25] X X Encryption S
PIRMAP [73] X X Encryption and PIR schema S
EPiC [24] X X Homomorphic encryption S
Powers and
Chen [88]
X Homomorphic Paillier encryption S
PFC [124] X FPGAs and proxy re-encryption M17
CryptDB [87] X X Variable homomorphic encryptions S
MrCrypt [103] X X Variable homomorphic encryptions M
Crypsis [100] X X Variable homomorphic encryptions
Dolev et al. [40] X X X Secret-sharing M
HybrEx. Hybrid Execution (HybrEx) [59] is the first MapReduce framework designed for the hybrid
cloud. In HybrEx, data is divided into sensitive and non-sensitive data, non-sensitive data is sent to
public clouds while sensitive data is kept in a private cloud. HybrEx allows four types of execution
models of MapReduce computations, as follows: (i) Map hybrid: the map phase is executed at both
public and private clouds, however, the reduce phase is executed at a private cloud only (Figure 12a);
(ii) Horizontal partitioning: the map phase is executed (on encrypted data) at public clouds only,
while the reduce phase is executed at a private cloud (Figure 12b); (iii) Vertical partitioning: the map
phase and the reduce phase are executed on both public and private clouds while data transmission
between private and public clouds is not allowed (Figure 12c); and (iv) Hybrid: the map phase and
the reduce phase are executed on both public and private clouds and data transmission among clouds
is also possible (Figure 12d). Two integrity check models, namely full integrity checking and quick
integrity checking, are also suggested. However, HybridEx does not deal with a key that is generated
at public and private clouds in the map phase.
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Sedic. In order to solve key problem of HybridEx [59], Sedic [129] provides strategic data movement
from the map phase that executes on public clouds to the reduce phase that executes on a private
cloud, by using an automatic analysis and transformation of the reduce code. In order to decrease the
communication between a public cloud and a private cloud, outputs of the map phase (at the public
cloud) are aggregated before their transmission to the private cloud. In addition, Sedic framework
automatically partitions a job by following security levels of data and distributes a job between private
and public clouds.
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Figure 13: Four scheduling modes in Tagged-MapReduce.
Tagged-MapReduce. HybrEx [59] and Sedic [129] consider data sensitivity before a job’s execution.
Tagged-MapReduce [127] identifies data-sensitivity during execution of a job, where the map phase
and the reduce phase are executed on public and private clouds. The framework handles sensitivity
of intermediate outputs that may contain sensitive data, and hence, cannot be processed by the
reduce phase at public clouds. Two policies, non-upgrading policy and downgrading policy, help in
identifying on-the-fly data sensitivity, and four scheduling modes (single-phase, two-phase crossing,
two-phase non-crossing, and hand-off modes), see Figure 13, assign outputs of the map phase to
reducers regarding data sensitivity. In addition, Tagged-MapReduce supports iterative MapReduce
jobs. However, HybrEx [59], Sedic [129], and Tagged-MapReduce [127] are unable to handle the
situation efficiently when a key is generated at public and private clouds. In order to solve this, Oktay
et al. [80] suggested Secure and Efficient MapReduce Over hybriD clouds (SEMROD) that prevents
the leakage of sensitive data and efficiently exploits public resources for executing a given single (or
multi-level) MapReduce job.
SEMROD. SEMROD [80] first finds sensitive and non-sensitive data and sends non-sensitive data to
public clouds. Private and public clouds execute the map phase. However, instead of sending only
outputs of the map phase containing sensitive keys to the private cloud, the private cloud pulls all the
outputs, but executes the reduce phase operation only on record associated with sensitive keys and
ignores non-sensitive keys. Public clouds execute the reduce phase on all the outputs. Hence, they
15H: Hybrid cloud.
16S: Single cloud.
17M: Multiple clouds.
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are unable to know the sensitive keys. At the end, a filtering step removes duplicate entries, creating
by sensitive key.
Prometheus. In order to outsource non-sensitive data, which is stored in relations, to public clouds,
Prometheus [138] removes quasi-identifiers (a quasi-identifier refers to a subset of attributes that
can uniquely identify most tuples in a relation [77, 85]) using a hypergraph. After the discovery of
quasi-identifiers, attributes are distributed over public clouds, and an attribute location table is used to
store name of relations and the location of relations-attributes. This allows the system to ensure that
no sensitive data is stored in untrusted public clouds. It also avoids heavy workload on reducers at the
user-end by sending merged outputs of public clouds and a mapping table of tuples from the private
cloud to the user. Reducers (at the user-end) construct the final output. On the downside, Prometheus
allows only search operations on a hybrid cloud.
A new framework for multiple clouds is proposed in [68]. The framework is divided into
three layers: (i) the physical layer – holds computational resources; (ii) the virtualization layer
– allows users to share the computational resources in a secure and isolated manner; and (iii)
the infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) layer – manages and creates virtual resources, provides user
management, and an access control method for accessing virtual resources. The IaaS layer has two
sub-layers, namely automatic deployment layer that (i) creates virtual machines on the user-defined
cloud, (ii) installs and configures Hadoop’s master process based on an assigned job, (iii) executes a
MapReduce job on the user-defined cloud, and monitoring layer that monitors all the virtual machines
and resources. The framework allows processing of sensitive data at a private cloud and processing
of non-sensitive data at a public cloud. The framework uses existing encryption, authentication, and
access control methods. A secure data exchange is carried out using secure transport protocols. After
a job completes, data is deleted immediately from the virtual resources, virtual machines are cleaned,
and results are sent back to the user. Hence, the cloud does not hold data for a long time, which incurs
users to send data every time to the cloud before computations.
Overhead issues. In most of the cases, apart from Sedic [129], the separation of sensitive and
non-sensitive data is performed manually at a private cloud. Such a process drastically reduces the
performance if datasets are huge. Moreover, a private cloud becomes a bottleneck if almost all the
tuples contain sensitive data, which is processed on a private cloud.
4.4.2. Data privacy with adversarial users
In many applications, data providers and data users are different parties and might be completely
separated. Examples of such applications are health service providers, pharmaceutical companies,
and genomic data providers. In those cases, there is a clear need for providing data access to external
parties for the purpose of research, monitoring, or knowledge sharing while providing sufficient data
protection for data providers. However, for those purposes, the management of access controls or
data encryption is not enough.
Data anonymization [136, 45] is a promising solution for ensuring data privacy on public clouds.
It works by hiding data identifiers, i.e., attributes that allow identification of specific individuals, by
changing information to some values, inserting records, and suppressing information [8, 71, 33].
Another notion of providing privacy, called Differential Privacy [42]. The idea of Differential
Privacy is to ensure that an addition or removal of a single dataset item does not substantially affects
the outcome of computations. In other words, adversary cannot distinguish between the results with
and without a specific dataset item. The most common ways to achieve differential privacy is by
addition of (specific) random noise to the sensitive data or computations, to hide an existence of
any individual record. Differential Privacy is currently considered de facto standard of private data
publishing as it provides rather strong privacy guarantee as it does not depend on auxiliary information
known to adversary or computational power.
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Additional privacy preserving methods for MapReduce are encryption-decryption-based
solutions [25, 73] and an accountability-based solution [123].
In [132, 133], the authors presented a new framework for MapReduce computations based on data
anonymization. The framework introduces a new layer, called Privacy-Preserving Layer (PPL, see
Figure 14), that exists between the original data and MapReduce framework for executing an assigned
job. The PPL layer takes privacy requirements and original data as inputs. The layer then can apply
different anonymization approaches according to the privacy requirements of data providers. This
allows flexibility in choosing different privacy mechanisms within a single framework.
Privacy preserving layer for data 
anonymization
Mapper
Reducer 
Public cloudPrivate cloud
Mapper
Mapper
Reducer 
Mapper
Reducer 
Mapper
Mapper
Reducer 
MapReduce job’s execution on 
anonymized data
Split1
Split2
Splitm
Input data
Figure 14: MapReduce framework with privacy-preserving layer.
Specifically, the PPL layer consists of four main modules, as follows: (i) Privacy Specification
Interface (PSI): takes several parameters as privacy specifications, (ii) Data Anonymizing (DA):
does anonymization of data using MapReduce based anonymization algorithms [134] and privacy
specifications, (iii) Data Update (DU): does anonymization of new data without anonymization of
data from scratch, and (iv) Anonymized Data sets Management (ADM): provides methods for storing
anonymized data in public clouds without breaching privacy of data.
Airavat [92] (see also Section 3.4.1) is the first system that combines mandatory access control
(MAC) and differential privacy for ensuring data privacy according to differential privacy definition
from untrusted users. Airavat allows users to submit MapReduce jobs with custom mappers and
reducers chosen from a pre-defined set of trusted reducers. Mandatory access control ensures that
untrusted mappers do not leak data outside the system via network or file system. Differential privacy
requirements are ensured on intermediate outputs by adding a random noise to them. In order to
maximize the utilization of the system and minimize the amount of added noise, the user has to
provide a range of output values for every provided mapper. If the output exceeds the range, it is
re-mapped to a random value in the range. Naturally, the system requires full trust in the cloud
provider that implements the protocol and ensures the integrity of its components.
Utility issues. All data anonymization methods have an inherent tradeoff between utilization and
privacy. Since data anonymization methods provide a high level of data privacy, the system utilization
may decrease. Also, it may be hard to ensure anonymized data after performing operations on it. For
example, joining of a relations having anonymized data with other relation having non-anonymized
data may reveal data of the first relation.18
4.4.3. Data privacy in adversarial clouds
The most obvious solution for ensuring privacy of data in public clouds is encryption of data;
however, it creates hurdles for an efficient utilization of MapReduce. In this section, we present some
existing techniques that enable cloud users to perform MapReduce computations on encrypted data,
while preserving privacy of data.
18http://privacyguidance.com/blog/10-big-data-analytics-privacy-problems/
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PRISM. Privacy-Preserving Search in MapReduce (PRISM) [25] alleviates the problem of storing
data in curious cloud providers by allowing searching for any user specified word in privacy
preserving manner, i.e., the cloud provider should not be able to learn the user query and data. The
proposed protocol consists of three phases, as follows: (i) upload of the data to the cloud, (ii) search
operation, and (iii) result analysis phase. During the upload phase, the user encrypts data using
state-full encryption algorithms, which add a frequency counters (as one of the possible options)
to each word to prevent the cloud provider from computing statistics about frequency of encrypted
text, and uploads the data to the cloud. In order to search the data, the user sends mappers and
reducers based on Trapdoor Private Information Retrieval [105] for acquiring search results. Note
that the cloud provider is considered honest-but-curious, and it will not change received mappers and
reducers.
PIRMAP. Another system leveraging Private Information Retrieval (PIR), first defined in [32], is
Private Information Retrieval for MapReduce (PIRMAP) [73]. PIRMAP is the first potentially
practical cPIR algorithm (a cPIR algorithm is an algorithm that assumes that the cloud (or data)
provider is polynomial-computational-bounded, as opposite to a generic case where the data provider
is not bounded), which can be used in a real-world scenario. PIRMAP follows a “classical” PIR
scheme (as defined [32] and improved in [66]) where the user sends an encrypted vector to the
cloud provider. The cloud provider splits the data into blocks and multiplies each block by the
received vector. Then, the cloud column-wise adds the results of the multiplication to create one-result
vector. The vector is then returned to the user who decrypts it. These two stages of the algorithm,
i.e., multiplication and column-wise sum, are quite easily mapped into two stages of MapReduce,
i.e., map and reduce. Calculation of PIR scheme by MapReduce algorithm is done concurrently,
according to the paradigm, and thus, allows great performance of otherwise computationally extensive
scheme. The output of the mapper is a key-value pair, where the key is the index of the block and
the value is a result of multiplication. Reducers then receive values of the column and perform the
sum operation. Consequently, PIRMAP allows users to privately retrieve information from the cloud,
using MapReduce.
EPiC. Efficient Privacy-Preserving Counting (EPiC) [24] protocol allows privacy-preserving
counting using MapReduce and allows users to store their data in public clouds privately, i.e. protected
from curious cloud providers. At the first phase, the user encrypts the data and uploads it to the cloud.
The data is encrypted in such way that an identical data value does not generate an identical ciphertext,
and hence, the cloud provider, which stores the (encrypted) data, cannot learn anything from the data
apart from trivial characteristics, such as data size. At the query stage, the user specifies a searching
pattern as a Boolean formula and generates mapper/reducer code for working on the encrypted data.
The computation is performed by using partially homomorphic encryption for protecting outputs of
the computation from the cloud provider. The cloud provider performs an assigned MapReduce
computation and counts the total number of occurrences of an assigned pattern without learning
neither the data, the pattern, nor how often it occurs. EPiC is based on an idea of transforming
the pattern search into a summation and polynomial evaluations, which can be done by partially
homomorphic encryption scheme in an efficient manner. The protocol uses weaker encryption scheme
for allowing more efficient execution of assigned queries. However, EPiC supports only counting
operations, which is a limitation of the protocol.
A similar protocol was presented, in [88], for allowing privacy preserving implementation of
the power iteration algorithm (a method for finding dominant eigenvectors for large matrices) on
MapReduce. The protocol uses partially homomorphic Paillier encryption [83] scheme for algorithm
computations. At the first stage of the protocol, the user encrypts the data using this encryption
scheme and uploads the data to the public cloud. At processing stage, the user uses random vectors
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for protecting intermediate outputs and performs MapReduce computations by utilizing homomorphic
properties of Paillier encryption scheme. The protocol is limited to computations of the specific
algorithm only.
PFC. Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and proxy re-encryption based privacy preserving
solution for MapReduce computation is presented, in [124], where data is kept in an encrypted form
in public clouds. An encryption algorithm is selected in a manner that data is easily partitioned
into a number of splits, to be processed by mappers. However, mappers and reducers are not
allowed to process encrypted splits and intermediate outputs, respectively. Mappers decrypt assigned
splits before processing them and again encrypt intermediate outputs. The reducer also first decrypt
intermediate outputs before processing and decrypt final outputs.
CryptDB. CryptDB [87] executes SQL queries over encrypted data providing practical confidentiality
for the users. The idea of CryptDB is that most of the queries use well-defined set of operations,
each of which is possible to support efficiently over encrypted data. CryptDB protects data from
curious DBA that snoops on the database server and from a curious cloud provider that holds the
servers and the data. The adversary does not change user queries. The tradeoff is between strong
encryption, which will not allow many operations on the data, and between weaker encryption with
more operations. Another tradeoff is minimizing the amount of leaked data when application servers
are compromised. The authors do not see arbitrary computations on encrypted data as practical; thus,
the application server has to be able to process decrypted data. (Their analysis over 128,840 queries
from MIT applications showed that CryptDB can support 99.5% of all queries. It reduces throughput
by 14.5% for full Web forums and by 26% for TPC-C queries comparing to unmodified MySQL.)
MrCrypt. Following the work of CryptDB [87], MrCrypt [103] suggests a way for executing
MapReduce computations on encrypted data stored on curious cloud providers. MrCrypt’s privacy
preserving mechanism is based on two observations, as: (i) many MapReduce jobs perform only a
limited set of basic operations on input data and (ii) homomorphic encryption schemas that enable
specific operations are much more efficient than fully homomorphic encryption ([46, 47]).
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Figure 15: MrCrypt framework.
MrCrypt, see Figure 15, performs static analysis of Java code for mapper and reducers at a private
cloud. Following the analysis, a minimal homomorphic encryption scheme is chosen for supporting
all the required operations in a legal and correct manner. The Java programs are then transformed
using this encryption scheme, and data is also encrypted using the scheme. Next, the user uploads
data and the transformed programs to a public cloud provider, which executes MapReduce job. The
final outputs of the job are sent back to the user and are decrypted using the chosen homomorphic
scheme. However, the downside of the approach is that it limits the range of possible queries on the
system.
31
Crypsis. The ideas of CryptDB [87] and MrCrypt [103] were taken to higher data languages by
Crypsis [100]. The system enables execution of Pig Latin jobs on a curious cloud provider without
exposing data. Crypsis executes a MapReduce job on encrypted data without decrypting it. In
order to do that, the system transforms a Pig Latin script so that it can be executed on encrypted
data. Crypsis uses existing practical partially homomorphic encryption schemes for data encryption.
The system works in the following phases: (i) script transformation, Pig Latin script is analyzed
and required encryption schemes are identified, the script is then changed to use encrypted data;
(ii) update cloud with missing encryption schemes: it is possible that data stored in the cloud is
missing some encryption schemes that are required for the given script, in that case those schemes are
identified and the cloud is updated with newly encrypted data; (iii) execute encrypted script on the
cloud infrastructure using pre-defined code provided by user stored with the data; (iv) re-encryption,
it is possible that intermediate outputs are generated during the execution of the script, in such cases
the data should be re-encrypted and (v) results, the results are sent to the user where they can be
decrypted.
Overhead issues. The main obstacle of providing privacy-preserving framework for MapReduce
cloud computations with a cloud provider acting as an adversary is computational and storage
efficiency. The currently known fully homomorphic encryption schemes computational overhead
is still prohibitively expensive [47]; thus, there is a need to find new schemes or methods of ensuring
data privacy. The research papers reviewed in this section show that a considerable advance was made
towards this goal. Nevertheless, all the above mentioned algorithms have common drawbacks such
as: limited range of allowed queries (as a tradeoff between preserving data privacy and utilization),
increased computation time, and in many cases an increased storage space for storing encrypted
data. Despite those difficulties, the future of privacy preserving computations in public clouds looks
promising and interesting.
4.4.4. Data privacy in adversarial clouds using secret-sharing
All the approaches suggested in Section 4.4.3 are based on encryption-decryption, which comes
at a price of computation and limited operations [111]. In [40], a Shamir’s secret-sharing [95] based
solution for five types of MapReduce computations such as count, search, fetch, equijoin, and range
selection is provided. The creation of secret-shares is computationally less expensive as compared to
encryption-decryption techniques, and it provides information-theoretically secure computation. The
suggested approach makes secret-shares of data and sends them to non-communicating clouds. A
user can execute MapReduce computations of the form of secret-shares in those clouds and receives
an answer of the form of secret-shares. By performing an interpolation technique, the user get the
desired result. By using secret-sharing of data and computation, the cloud cannot learn the database
and computation. Also, the user cannot learn the whole database. However, the use of more than one
cloud increases costs.
5. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
Processing a huge amount of data is not simple using the classical parallel computing, due to
the failure of computing nodes and scalability of the system. MapReduce, developed by Google in
2004, provides an efficient, fault tolerant, scalable, and transparent processing of large-scale data.
However, MapReduce was not designed to be deployed on public and hybrid clouds, where security
and privacy of data and computations are two prime concerns. Since public clouds provide an easy
way for computations and storage, a number of algorithms and frameworks regarding security and
privacy of data-computations were developed for executing a MapReduce job on public and hybrid
clouds.
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In this survey, we discussed security and privacy challenges and requirements in MapReduce.
Security attacks in MapReduce – impersonation, denial-of-services, replay, eavesdropping,
man-in-the-middle, and repudiation attacks – are presented. We consider four types of adversarial
models, namely honest-but-curious, malicious, knowledgeable, and network and nodes access
adversaries, and show how they can impact a MapReduce computation. We reviewed many of the
existing algorithms and frameworks for ensuring security and privacy in the scope of MapReduce.
Existing algorithms and frameworks succeed in solving the specific security and privacy problems
in MapReduce. For example, data transmission and data storage are protected by encryption
mechanisms; authentication and authorization solutions are based on existing secret key and
integrated systems (such as SELinux); the result verification is done by replication of tasks; and
privacy is ensured using data anonymization, differential privacy, and private information retrieval.
Privacy preserving research is still struggling with providing a high utilization of MapReduce
framework. While the reviewed papers show potentially practical solutions for specific problems,
there is still considerable overhead (in terms of the workload on the framework) and limitations in
utilization of the framework.
Based on this survey, we identified several important issues and challenges that require further
research, as follows:
• Extending the authorization framework (security of MapReduce), i.e., how to incorporate
advanced authorization policies (e.g., role-based or attribute-based access control policy) in
MapReduce framework? This is particularly important if the mappers need to access different
sources of data within the cluster.
• Integrating with a trust infrastructure (security of MapReduce). There are several domains
of trust that must be made explicit and verified for MapReduce framework. These include:
trust in the hardware, virtual machine, and file system that mappers and reducers use, trust that
MapReduce code is not malicious or does not try to leak confidential data, and trust in the cloud
provider for providing the necessary resources to run MapReduce algorithms.
• Processing on encrypted data (security and privacy of MapReduce). Although, as we have seen,
some work has been done in this area, especially using homomorphic encryption, more research
is needed in order to enable various MapReduce algorithms on encrypted data.
• Supporting multiple geographically distributed clusters for executing a single job (security and
privacy of MapReduce). Often data and computing resources for a single job may exist in
different independent clusters. For example, a bio-informatic application that tries to analyze
genomes existing in different countries and labs in order to track the sources of a potential
epidemic. How MapReduce can be extended to multiple clusters, with support for privacy of
the sensitive information across the clusters is an open research problem.
• Extending MapReduce algorithms with privacy preserving support (privacy of MapReduce).
These include support for secure computations between reducers and across clusters. Also,
privacy policies, which define exactly what kind of aggregated or anonymized data can be
output, need to be defined.
Another lacking field of the research is holistic frameworks (with a salient exception of
Airavat [92]), i.e., frameworks that solve more than a single problem, especially solving both the
security and privacy aspects, and integrating some of the mentioned algorithms and frameworks,
which provide computational security and privacy of data for MapReduce computations. We believe
that in the future we will have MapReduce frameworks that provide multiple types of computations
in information secure manner.
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